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DID YOU SAY “ASININE” MILORD? – 
Bekker v Naude en andere 2003 5 SA 173 (SCA) 
 
1 Introduction 
Bekker v Naude en andere 2003 5 SA 173 (SCA) concerned the vexing question 
whether a will that was drafted by an attorney or other advisor of a person, since 
deceased, but which was never executed by the deceased, and indeed complies with 
none of the formalities for a valid will, can be accepted as a document that was 
“drafted” by the deceased, and therefore be “rescued” and made effective in terms of 
the power of condonation conferred on a court by section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 
1953 (as amended) (hereinafter called “the Act” or the “Wills Act”) if the court is 
satisfied that the deceased intended the document to be his or her will.  Since section 
2(3) was enacted in 1992 there have been no less than 25 reported decisions 
concerning section 2(3), and many of them have concerned this question.  (For a 
discussion of the leading cases see Corbett, Hofmeyr, and Kahn The Law of 
Succession in South Africa 2ed (2002) 57-66, hereinafter referred to as “Corbett”).  
The first few decisions concerning this question took a narrow approach to the 
meaning of the term “drafted” in section 2(3) that did not favour rescue, but a more 
flexible or liberal approach emerged which was soon favoured by the weight of 
judicial opinion (see Corbett 59-65).  The apogee of this approach to section 2(3) is 
perhaps the decision in Ex parte Williams: In re Williams’ Estate 2000 4 SA 168 (T) 
where Swart J, delivering the unanimous judgment of a full bench of the Transvaal 
Provincial Division, went so far as to describe the strict approach to section 2(3) as 
“an asinine culmination of the very sound reason for promulgating s 2(3)” (see 
Williams 177G-H).  However, the Supreme Court of Appeal has now overruled the 
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flexible or liberal approach in a unanimous judgment in Bekker in which the so-called 
“asinine” arguments have been accepted and applied!  Such are the vagaries of 
statutory interpretation.  What follows is an account and evaluation of this decision; 
but first it will be useful to set out the provisions of section 2(3).  It reads as follows: 
“If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of 
a document drafted or executed by a person who has died 
since the drafting or execution thereof, was intended to be 
his will or an amendment of his will, the court shall order 
the Master to accept that document, or that document as 
amended, for the purposes of the Administration of Estates 
Act, 1965 (Act 66 of 1965), as a will, although it does not 
comply with all the formalities for the execution or 
amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1).” 
2 The facts and judgment 
Bekker concerned a joint will drafted by a bank official for the deceased and the 
appellant (the unsuccessful applicant in the court a quo), to whom the deceased was 
married.  During October 1993 the deceased and the appellant consulted with an 
official of Absa Bank and requested that a joint will be drawn up for them.  They 
explained what they required, the bank official took notes, and these notes were sent 
to the bank’s head office where other bank officials used the bank’s standard 
precedents to draw up a draft will (“’n konsep-testament”).  The will was posted to the 
deceased and the appellant with the request that they sign it in the presence of 
witnesses but it had not been signed at the time the deceased died, despite the fact that 
it had then been in his possession for some years.  (See Bekker para 2 & 3 for these 
facts).  An application to the court a quo (the WLD) for the rescue of the draft will 
was unsuccessful (the judge was unaware of a full bench decision against him in 
Williams) but leave to appeal was granted. 
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Olivier JA, who delivered the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Afrikaans, pointed out that the document was drawn up by an official of the bank 
on the instructions of the deceased and his wife, and was never signed.  This raised 
the legal question whether the document was “drafted” by the deceased; and involved 
the debate whether, in the context of section 2(3) of the Wills Act, the word “drafted” 
(or “opgestel”) has the limited meaning of personally written, personally typed or 
personally brought into being through other means; or whether it has the wider 
meaning of caused to be drafted (“laat opstel”), as in caused to be written, caused to 
be typed, or caused to be made (“soos in laat skryf, laat tik of laat maak het”).  (See 
Bekker para 8 (although italics have been used for emphasis here as in the reported 
judgment, the original judgment used underlining). 
Olivier JA then referred briefly to the decisions that have supported the narrow and 
liberal interpretations respectively, alluded to some of the arguments used as 
ingenious, and indicated that it was unnecessary for him to go through all the 
arguments used because in his view the narrow interpretation was clearly the correct 
one, for a number of reasons.  (See Bekker para 11).  Olivier JA began by referring to 
the basic principle that the ordinary, grammatical, meaning of a word must be used 
unless it would lead to absurdity, inconsistency, or hardship, or result in an anomaly, 
so that the court in the light of an interpretation of the legislation as a whole, is 
convinced that a strictly literal interpretation was not intended by the legislature (see 
Bekker para 12).  He indicated that none of these grounds for departing from the 
ordinary meaning were present and that on the contrary there are strong indications in 
the Act that the legislature intended a strict interpretation of the word “opgestel” in 
section 2(3).  These indications were to be found in section 2A, which was enacted at 
the same time as section 2(3), and which clearly indicated that the legislature was 
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aware of the distinction between “opstel” and “laat opstel” and expressly used the 
wider words where that was intended.  That the legislature did not do so in section 
2(3) was, in the opinion of Olivier JA, a decisive indication that in section 2(3) the 
narrow meaning was intended; and he found the contrary opinions expressed in 
Williams and Back and others NNO v Master of the Supreme Court [1996] 2 All SA 
161 (C) to be unconvincing.  Olivier JA expressly confirmed that the judgments in 
Webster v The Master & others 1996 1 SA 34 (D) and Olivier v Die Meester en 
andere: In re Boedel Wyle Olivier 1997 1 SA 836 (T) are correct on this point (See 
Bekker para 14).  It is important to note, however, that Olivier JA did not refer to, 
much less endorse, the argument that was advanced in Webster and Olivier that 
substantial compliance with the will-making formalities is a pre-requisite for the use 
of section 2(3).  Furthermore, it is clear from Bekker that handwritten drafting is not 
required either (contra Webster and contra Wood-Bodley “The ‘Rescue Provisions’ of 
the Wills Act 1953 (as amended)” 1997 SALJ 1 10-12). 
Olivier JA then proceeded to deal with various arguments that were cited by Van Zyl 
J in Back in favour of a broad interpretation.  Van Zyl J had argued with respect to 
section 2(3) that it was the intention of the legislature to avoid the situation where a 
testator’s clearly expressed intentions are frustrated by non-compliance with 
formalities, and that to interpret section 2(3) as requiring personal drafting would have 
the absurd result of increasing the formalities, not reducing them.  Regarding this 
argument, Olivier JA held that, although the intention of the legislature was to confer 
on the courts a power of condonation, this clearly did not mean that all prerequisites 
were thrown overboard.  The requirement of a document drafted by the testator had 
been included, in unambiguous language, and for good reason.  Will-making 
formalities have existed for centuries in an attempt to prevent fraud, and disputes after 
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a testator’s death, and this objective was kept in mind by the legislature even as it 
conferred a power of condonation.  The requirement of a document personally drafted 
by the testator guarantees a degree of reliability because it requires evidence of 
personal conduct by the testator out of which his or her intention can be clearly 
deduced.  If the broader interpretation advocated by Van Zyl J were to be adopted, the 
possibilities for fraud and false allegations after the testator’s death would be much 
greater.  (See Bekker para 16 for these comments). 
Olivier JA also rejected Van Zyl J’s argument that for the purposes of section 2(3) it 
is not the function of the court to ascertain whether or not the document before the 
court was drafted or executed by the deceased, but merely whether it was intended to 
be the deceased’s will.  Olivier JA found this approach to be in conflict with the 
wording of section 2(3) and he stated that it simply cannot be correct.  (See Bekker 
para 17). 
Another argument that had been advanced by Van Zyl J in favour of a broad 
interpretation was that it is in conformity with the recommendation of the law 
commission (section 2(3) was introduced following a recommendation by the South 
African Law Commission - see Review of the Law of Succession (Project 22 June 
1991 para 2.29).  However, Olivier JA pointed out that the commission’s 
recommendation in this respect was not accepted by the legislature, which introduced 
the requirement of a document drafted by the deceased, and that the history of section 
2(3) therefore indicates clearly that the legislature intended the narrower approach to 
the section.  (See Bekker paras 18 & 19). 
Olivier JA concluded, therefore, that there are no grounds for departing from the 
ordinary literal meaning of section 2(3), and that  
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“Die hof het ‘n ‘kondoneringsbevoegdheid’ slegs indien 
die voorgenome testament deur die oorledene persoonlik 
tot stand gebring was.” 
(Bekker para 20.  This may be translated as: “The court has a power of condonation 
only if the proposed will was brought into existence by the testator personally”).  
Although a literal reading of this statement suggests that even a document executed by 
the testator, but without full compliance with the formalities, must have been drafted 
by the testator personally if it is to be rescued, this clearly was not Olivier JA’s 
intention, for such an approach is not referred to elsewhere in his judgment and would 
be in conflict with the language of the section, which refers to a document “drafted or 
executed” by a person who has died. 
In the light of Olivier JA’s interpretation of section 2(3), the will prepared by the bank 
did not meet the requirements of the section, and the judgment of the court a quo, 
refusing an order in terms of the section, was accordingly upheld.  (See Bekker paras 
20 & 21). 
3 Evaluation & discussion 
An authoritative decision on the compass of section 2(3) has been sorely needed, and 
the particular interpretation adopted in Bekker is, in my view, correct and to be 
welcomed.  However, the judgment leaves a number of loose ends. 
Whilst it is clear that a document drafted by an advisor and merely read and approved 
by the deceased no longer qualifies as a document drafted by the deceased, there is an 
element of ambiguity around exactly how personal the drafting must be.  What of the 
will dictated by the deceased to a secretary for typing?  Describing the strict approach, 
which is the approach he subsequently adopted, Olivier JA refers in one part of the 
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judgment to a document “personally written or typed or brought into being personally 
by other means” (see para 9, my translation), and in another part to one “personally 
drafted, written, typed or brought into existence, as for example by dictation” (see 
para 8, my translation, underlining supplied).  Whilst it seems clear from the second 
quotation that a document typed by a secretary but dictated by the deceased would 
qualify for rescue, the compass of “personally drafted” is not entirely clear.  Must the 
typed document first have been read and approved by the deceased?  What if the 
document is dictated into a dictaphone and only typed after the deceased’s death?  
What if it is typed by a secretary on a computer, approved by the deceased “on 
screen”, and only printed after the deceased’s death?  (See Macdonald and others v 
The Master and others 2002 5 SA 64 (O) for a similar situation, except that the 
deceased typed the document himself).  However, these are exceptional 
circumstances. 
Section 2(3) provides for the rescue of a document “drafted or executed” by a person 
who has died.  Although Bekker was concerned only with an unexecuted document, 
the judgment has implications for the rescue of documents not drafted by the deceased 
that have been executed, albeit defectively.  The argument in favour of requiring 
personal drafting in order for an unexecuted document to be rescued, which is based 
on a comparison of the language of section 2(3) and section 2A, also applies to a 
document that has been defectively executed.  All three subsections of section 2A 
expressly provide for some act done or caused to be done by the deceased which, 
when coupled with revocatory intention, triggers the operation of the section, thereby 
permitting the court to declare the deceased’s defective attempt at revocation to be 
legally effective.  However, section 2(3) does not make provision for a document 
which the deceased has caused to be executed; on the contrary, with respect to an 
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executed document, it requires a document executed ‘by a person who has died’.  It 
follows from this significant difference between section 2(3) and section 2A that the 
maxim qui facit per alium, facit per se (ie he who acts through another, acts in person) 
is not intended to apply with respect to section 2(3) and that personal conduct by the 
deceased is required, whether one is dealing with a document drafted by the deceased 
or one executed by the deceased.  If this view is correct, then a document executed by 
an amanuensis on behalf of the testator, but which is defective for any reason, whether 
relating to the certification requirements of section 2(1)(a)(v), or otherwise, cannot be 
rescued, unless the document was personally drafted by the deceased (an unlikely 
situation), because the document was not personally executed by the person who has 
died.  However, the rescue of a document signed by the deceased with a mark will not 
be hit by this difficulty.  Although the differential treatment of these two situations 
may at first blush appear to be anomalous, the use of an amanuensis could increase 
the possibilities for fraud (particularly where the formality that is lacking is 
certification by a commissioner of oaths), therefore the exclusion of such documents 
from the ambit of section 2(3) can be justified.  (For the rescue of a document 
executed with a thumbprint, in which the certification formalities were not complied 
with, see O’Connor v The Master and another 1999 4 SA 614 (NC), also [1999] 3 All 
SA 652 (NC)).   
In the nature of things, few testators draft their own wills - most defectively executed 
wills will have been drafted by an advisor.    Therefore, a consequence of the decision 
in Bekker is going to be a greater focus on the meaning of the term “executed” in the 
context of section 2(3).  The compass of the word “executed” will be crucial 
whenever there is a defective attempt at execution of a will that was drafted by an 
attorney or other advisor.  When will a document be regarded as having been executed 
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by the deceased?  What level of compliance with the will-making formalities will be 
required?  What, for example, of a document that is merely signed at the bottom of the 
last page, with no initialling or signing of earlier pages?  Or of a document that is only 
signed at the top of the page?  What of the will in In the Estate of Cook (deceased) 
[1960] 1 All ER 689 (PDA) which simply ended with the words “Your loving 
mother”?  The possible permutations are legion.   
The term “executed” appears in a number of sections of the Act in addition to section 
2(3).  (See s 2(1)(a)&(b), s 2(2), s 2B, s 3bis(1), s 3bis(1)(a)(i)&(ii), s 3bis(1)(e), 
s 3bis(2)&(3) and s 4A(1)&(2)(a).  The term “executed” appears in s 7).  The term is 
not defined in the Act, and the Bekker judgment gives no guidance as to how it is to 
be interpreted, save for its timely reminder that the so-called golden rule of 
interpretation applies also to section 2(3). 
The dictionary definitions of “execute” are not particularly helpful in this context.  
Insofar as the definitions are relevant to the execution of documents, they carry the 
connotation of compliance with the formalities required to give validity to the 
document concerned.  Thus, in the context of executing documents, The Oxford 
English Dictionary Vol III (1933) defines the term as follows: 
“To go through the formalities necessary to the validity 
of (a legal act, e.g. a bequest, agreement, mortgage, 
etc.).  Hence, to complete and give validity to (the 
instrument by which such act is effected) by performing 
what the law requires to be done, as by signing, sealing, 
etc.”  
Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1974) includes the 
definition “To make legal or valid by fulfilling all requirements of law”.  Burke 
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Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law 2ed (1977) sv “Execute” begins “to complete or 
carry into effect.  Thus, to execute a deed is to sign, seal and deliver it”.  Walker The 
Oxford Companion to Law (1980) sv “Execution of deeds” refers to “The rules 
defining in what way a deed or will must be authenticated by a party to be legally 
valid and effective”.  West’s Law and Commercial Dictionary in Five Languages 
(1985) defines “execute” thus “To complete; to make; to sign; to perform; to do; to 
follow out; to carry out according to its terms; to fulfill (sic) the command or purpose 
of.  To perform all necessary formalities, as to make and sign a contract, or sign and 
deliver a note”.  Garner A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (1987) has the 
following definition 
“execute (= to sign and deliver; to make valid by 
observing certain required formalities) is useful lawyers’ 
ARGOT in reference to completing legal documents … In 
this sense the word means ‘to go through the formalities 
necessary to the validity of (a legal act) – hence, to 
complete and give validity to (the instrument by which 
such an act is effected) by performing what the law 
requires to be done’”.   
Encarta Concise English Dictionary  (2001) includes the definition “to sign a will or 
other legal document in the presence of witnesses in order to make it binding”.   
Despite the dictionary emphasis on compliance with the legal requirements for 
validity, compliance with formalities is clearly not what is intended by the use of the 
term “execute” in section 2(3).  The word “execute” needs to be interpreted in 
conjunction with the qualifying phrase used later in section 2(3), which reads 
“although it does not comply with all the formalities for the execution or amendment 
of wills”.  There have been various views as to the import of the word “all” in that 
Page 11 
 
phrase with some early decisions suggesting that some degree of compliance with the 
will-making formalities is required (see Stoltz I D v The Master and another 1994 2 
PH G2 (E) 7, Webster v The Master & others supra especially 42F-G, Horn en andere 
v Horn en andere 1995 1 SA 48 (W) especially 49F-H, Back & others NNO v Master 
of the Supreme Court [1996] 2 All SA 161 (C) at 170c-e, and Ex parte Williams: In re 
Williams’ Estate supra at 179G-180C; see also Wood-Bodley supra at 6-8, and 
Corbett at 64-65).  However, it is implicit in Bekker (contra Webster, and Horn) that a 
document that has merely been drafted by the deceased, without execution in any 
way, can be rescued, provided the deceased drafted it personally.  Accordingly, it 
seems clear that section 2(3) may be used irrespective whether all, any, or only one of 
the will-making requirements was not complied with.  (This was also the 
interpretation adopted in Stoltz 7). 
A number of points can be made around this requirement of an “executed” document.  
A document is executed by the act of signing (cf Mdlulu v Delarey and others [1998] 
1 All SA 434 (W) 442h) .  That is signing by affixing either a signature or by affixing 
a mark; and initials constitute a form of mark, except where the definition of “sign” in 
the Wills Act is applicable (as to the meaning of “sign” and “signature” in ordinary 
usage, untrammelled by any definition in the Wills Act, see the discussion in Harpur 
NO v Govindamall and another 1993 4 SA 751 (A) 756I – 759F).  The words 
“although it does not comply with all the formalities for the execution or amendment 
of wills” in section 2(3) indicate that there is no need to comply in any respect with 
the detailed requirements of the will-making formalities, such as the use of witnesses, 
the number of signatures that must be affixed to the document, or the precise position 
of the testator’s signature in order to bring the document within the ambit of section 
2(3).  “Execution” implies a serious act by which the deceased indicates that the 
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document constitutes the final expression of his or her testamentary wishes not subject 
to change except by means of a fresh and separate amendment or codicil (see 
Anderson and Wagner NNO & another v The Master and others 1996 3 SA 779 
(CPD) 784G-785B where the intention required by s 2(3) is discussed).  A document 
cannot be executed orally, or impliedly, there must be some signature or mark which 
is affixed to the document with the serious intention I have referred to above.  The 
method of execution used by the deceased may influence the conclusion whether the 
document was intended to be a will, particularly in view of the principle caveat 
subscriptor in terms of which one is bound by what appears above one’s signature. 
The execution of a document in electronic format would be problematic.  The legal 
recognition of data messages, and the electronic signature of them, conferred by the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (“the ECT Act”) does 
not apply to the Wills Act (see s 4(3) read with Schedule 1 of the ECT Act), nor must 
the ECT Act be construed as giving validity to “[t]he execution, retention and 
presentation of a will or codicil as defined in the Wills Act, 1953” (Schedule 2 read 
with s 4(4) of the ECT Act, emphasis supplied).  However, if the deceased personally 
drafted the will as a data message (eg as a computer file) and it was printed after the 
deceased’s death and the court could be persuaded that in the context of section 2(3) 
of the Wills Act this meant that the deceased drafted the document that was printed 
after his or her death, or if the court could be persuaded, without reliance on the 
provisions of the ECT Act, that the data message itself was a “document” within the 
meaning of that term in section 2(3) of the Wills Act, then it might be possible to 
rescue it.  However, the matter is problematic. 
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It will probably be clear in most instances whether a document has been executed 
within the meaning of section 2(3) but it is inevitable that there will be some difficult 
cases.  Where a deceased accidentally omitted to sign one page of a multiple page 
will, as occurred in Theron and another v Master of the High Court [2001] 3 SA 507 
(NC), rescue should be possible.  However, where one page of the will executed by 
the deceased is approved by her in draft form but does not comprise part of the final 
printing of the executed will, as occurred in Ex parte De Swardt and another NNO 
1998 2 SA 203 (C), then it is doubtful that rescue will now be possible.  The decision 
in De Swardt was based on the ground that, by reading and approving the draft will 
prepared by her attorney, the deceased could be regarded as having drafted the will 
herself (De Swardt 206H-J), but this ground is now excluded by the decision in 
Bekker.  It will be difficult to regard a page of a will as having been executed by the 
deceased when it was not part of the document that was executed, even though it was 
present in an earlier draft, and therefore it seems that it will not longer be possible to 
rescue a will in those circumstances.  What of the following fictitious scenario?  The 
deceased leaves a handwritten suicide note on his bedside table.  The note reads “I 
can’t go on anymore.  My will is attached.  Sorry.  Michael”.  The word in italics is 
written as a signature.  Attached to the note with a pin is a typed will that was posted 
to the deceased by his attorney as a draft for approval.  This will is not signed, 
initialled, or marked by anyone, except that the amount in one legacy has been altered 
by hand and the deceased’s signature appears next to the alteration.  Do we have here 
a will that has been executed for the purposes of section 2(3)? 
4 Conclusion 
A document must have been personally drafted or personally executed by the 
deceased to qualify for rescue in terms of section 2(3) of the Wills Act.  It will no 
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longer be possible for an unexecuted document, drafted by an attorney, accountant, 
bank, or other advisor, to be rescued from invalidity using section 2(3).  Where the 
document is indeed executed, however, then it will be irrelevant who drafted it (see 
Mdlulu v Delarey and others (supra) 442f-h). 
Although most situations will probably be straightforward, there is room for debate as 
to what qualifies as personal drafting or personal execution.  It seems clear, however, 
that substantial compliance with the will-making formalities is not required for a 
document to be regarded as having been executed within the meaning of section 2(3). 
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